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Abstract 
 
This article proposes a model of treaty-based veil piercing for civil liability claims by 
victims of human rights harm inflicted by businesses. The primary inspiration for this 
model comes from investment treaty provisions dealing with corporate investors. Our 
examination of investment law for this purpose exposes the double standard in the 
treatment of the corporate veil between these two remedy regimes, and offers a way 
to address this. The test we propose for lifting the veil in order to allow victims to claim 
against the parent company in a corporate group is one of ‘legal control’. It aims to 
capture cases where the parent did not necessarily take an active role in the 
subsidiary’s business, but it is still treated as being in control of it by virtue of its direct 
or indirect ownership or ability to appoint management.  
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I. Introduction  
 
Transnational business is frequently conducted through a corporate structure 
of subsidiary companies located and operating in host states.1 More often than not the 
parent company will use layers of intermediaries to distance itself legally from the host 
state subsidiary and/or to benefit from a favourable regulatory framework. Where 
corporate related human rights abuses occur in host states, victims in the first instance 
would be likely to seek to obtain remedy for these in the host state, against the locally 
incorporated subsidiary. Where the host state has an ineffective legal system or the 
local subsidiary is underfunded or defunct, victims of such human rights impacts have 
sought to attribute blame to the parent company for the actions of its subsidiary, and 
to obtain a remedy through the courts of the parent company’s home state.2 A pressing 
issue arising from the victims’ inability to obtain justice locally3 is whether they can 
                                                          
** Lecturer, School of Law, University of Essex 
* PhD Candidate, School of Law, University of Essex  
1 ‘Host state’ is used in this article as a reference to the state where the victims have suffered the human rights 
harm.  
2 ‘Home state’ is used in this article as a reference to the state where the parent company, whose actions or 
omissions directly or via its subsidiaries resulted in or contributed to the human rights harm, is located.  
3 Other significant barriers to access to justice include costs of litigation, intimidation of victims and witnesses, 
evidentiary burdens, and limitation periods; See G Skinner et al., ‘Third Pillar: Access to Judicial Remedies for 
Human Rights Violations by Transnational Business’, 2013 ICAR CORE ECCJ <http://icar.ngo/wp-
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pursue the parent company in the home state’s courts for the harm inflicted by its 
subsidiary’s activities that materialized in the host state. In order to successfully 
advance such a claim, claimants need to overcome, inter alia, the ‘corporate veil’ 
challenge, a path fraught with difficulties. Obstacles posed by corporate veil in access 
to remedy have been documented in case law,4 scholarly writing5 and recognised in 
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (‘UNGPs’).6  
The UNGPs, in their third pillar on ‘access to remedy’, reaffirm the duty of states 
to provide effective remedies to victims of human rights abuses committed by 
businesses as part of the states’ general duty to protect under international human 
rights law.7 In fulfilling this duty states are asked to remove legal and other obstacles, 
including those created by corporate group structures and denials of justice in host 
states.8 The momentum gained by the endorsement of the UNGPs now continues with 
a proposal to conclude an internationally binding instrument on business and human 
rights (‘B&HR’).9 One of the central aims of the UNGPs and the proposed treaty on 
B&HR is to enhance access to effective remedy for victims of corporate related human 
rights abuses (‘B&HR claimants’). In this article, we aim to move the discussion 
forward on what protections a draft convention on business and human rights should 
contain, and in particular make a concrete proposal on how it can enhance access to 
remedy. A treaty in this area promises to make a significant contribution to enhancing 
access to remedy. We propose that as part of a framework to enhance access to 
remedy, the treaty should contain a model of treaty-based veil piercing. This model 
would carve out an exception to the classic rule of separate personality for civil liability 
claims brought against parent companies by workers and communities whose human 
rights have been impacted by the activities of the subsidiary.  
 The essence of our proposal is guided by the treaty-based veil-piercing model 
found in international investment law (‘IIL’), which treats the issue of the corporate veil 
quite differently from the way in which it is treated in the civil liability claims under 
                                                          
content/uploads/2013/02/The-Third-Pillar-Access-to-Judicial-Remedies-for-Human-Rights-Violation-by-
Transnational-Business.pdf> 
4 Some well-known examples of such cases include, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy 244 F Supp 
2d 289 (SDNY 2003); In re Union Carbide Corp Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal 634 F Supp 842 (SDNY 1986); Aguinda 
v Texaco, Inc 142 F Supp 2d 534 (SDNY 2001); Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum 226 F 3d 88 (2d Cir 2000); 
Recherches Internationales Quebec v Cambior Inc [1998] QJ No 2554, Quebec Super Ct, 14 August 1998; Lubbe 
v Cape plc [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 139 (CA). 
5 See for instance S Joseph, Corporations and Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Hart Publishing 2004); G 
Skinner et al. (n.3) and S Baughen, Human Rights and Corporate Wrongs: Closing the Governance Gap (Edward 
Elgar 2015) 179-190.  
6 “Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie” (2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/31; Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework 
(United Nations publication, Sales No. 13.XIV.5), < 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf>; UN Human Rights Council 
endorsed the Guiding Principles in its resolution 17/4 of 16 June 2011, Guiding Principle 26. 
7 Principle 25, UNGPs. 
8 Principle 26 UNGPs. 
9 UN Human Rights Council Resolution on “Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights”, (2014) UN Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/26/9. 
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consideration.10 Despite key parallels in obstacles in access to remedy created by 
local denials of justice and by the corporate veil in both areas, the existing legal 
framework contains a double standard which favours international investors when it 
comes to the application of the corporate veil principle.11 The corporate veil is more 
readily disregarded in IIL decisions in order to protect the parent company’s access to 
benefits under an investment treaty, as compared with the difficulty experienced by 
B&HR claimants in piercing the same corporate veil when seeking to hold parent 
companies liable for harm caused by their subsidiaries. The reason for this is the 
availability of IIL rules12 which allow a reverse piercing of the corporate veil13 using a 
test of ‘legal control’, i.e. the parent can claim directly against the host state for harm 
suffered by directly or indirectly owned subsidiaries. As the current legal framework 
stands, there are no rules analogous to the IIL rules on veil-piercing which would allow 
courts to disregard separate personality in civil liability claims brought by B&HR 
claimants against transnational businesses. States have long carved out exceptions 
to the separate personality rule in order to maximize investor protection in investment 
treaties. We argue that protection of human rights is a goal that warrants an equivalent 
treaty commitment carving out a similar exception for B&HR claimants.  
B&HR and IIL have hitherto been perceived as having restraining effects on 
their mutual advancement.14 The restraining effect of IIL on B&HR is partly due to the 
                                                          
10 Of necessity, given that our model is inspired by IIL, it does not address the situation where a transnational 
business is comprised of a series of companies connected by contractual relationships only, rather than through 
equity ownership; This therefore excludes victims who have suffered human rights abuses at the hands of such 
contractual partner businesses from access to remedy from our model e.g. Jabir et al. v KiK Textilien und Non-
Food GmbH (Landgericht Dortmund)  (Case concerning damages for death and personal injury resulting from 
fire at factory of primary supplier to the KiK clothing company); ECCHR Case Report available at 
<www.ecchr.eu/en/our_work/business-and-human-rights/working-conditions-in-south-asia/pakistan-
kik.html>. 
11 This double standard in application of corporate veil principle to investors and victims is not limited to 
remedies. For instance corporate veil shields shareholders from liability, preventing B&HR victims from having 
access to the funds received by the parent but it does not interfere with the upstream flow of profits from the 
subsidiary to the parent.  Areas of law that aim to safeguard the healthy functioning of markets, e.g. securities 
law, competition law and IIL, recognise the necessity to disregard separate personality between the 
shareholders and the company to protect the free market interests, but policy-makers have not embraced the 
same pragmatism to protect against human rights abuses by corporate actors. See G Skinner, ‘Parent Company 
Accountability: Ensuring Justice for Human Rights Violations’, 2015, ICAR, 9-10 <http://icar.ngo/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/ICAR-Parent-Company-Accountability-Project-Report.pdf> p. 8-11. 
12 Particularly in bilateral investment treaties and the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States (Adopted 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966) 
575 UNTS 159  (‘ICSID Convention’). 
13 This concept was previously used in the context of securities litigation where the company is held legally 
responsible for the liabilities of its shareholders, See for instance Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Stratton 
Oakmont, Inc., 234 B.R. 293, 321 (S.D. N.Y. 1999). 
14 On one hand IIL is perceived as restraining advancement of human rights protection from business activity, 
See for instance UNGA ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the rights of indigenous 
peoples on the impact of international investment and free trade on the human rights of indigenous peoples’, 
(7 August 2015) UN Doc A/70/301; On the other hand, further regulation of corporate activity in the name of 
human rights protection was perceived as a threat to promotion of investment; See C Jochnick and N Rabaeus, 
‘Business and Human Rights Revitalized: A new UN Framework meets Texaco in the Amazon’, (2010) 33 Suffolk 
Transnat'l L. Rev. 413, 416-417; On the substance of the relationship between these two fields and home state 
responsibility see: R McCorquodale and P Simons ‘Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for 
Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law’ (2007) 70 MLR 598, 621-623 (They 
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problem of asymmetry in IIL that it gives rights to investors but places no or minimal 
obligations on them vis-à-vis the host states or host communities in which they 
operate. In response to this, proposals have been advanced to include substantive 
commitments from states in investment treaties to ensure business respect for human 
rights,15 and one new investment treaty goes as far as including rights for the benefit 
of third parties adversely affected by investor activity in investment treaties.16 There 
have also been numerous discussions on how to overcome the corporate veil 
challenge to access to remedy.17 In this article, we are proposing a positive 
contribution from the existing IIL system to the advancement of B&HR. The IIL model 
of treaty based veil piercing is an efficient model for overcoming the corporate veil 
obstacle and could guide the development of treaty practice in the field of B&HR. 
Granting B&HR claimants the right under an international treaty to pursue parent 
companies in their home jurisdiction, with home states being responsible for ensuring 
that their laws would allow claims to be made against the parent entity, would assist 
in closing the accountability gap in cases involving harm by transnational businesses, 
bringing victims one step closer to effective remedies. 
 
This article begins by briefly explaining the corporate veil challenge to access 
to remedy for B&HR claimants in cases involving harm caused by transnational 
business enterprises. This is followed by a discussion of the treatment of the corporate 
veil under IIL. Having explained the treatment of the corporate veil in both areas, we 
move on to an analysis of the commonalities and differences between IIL and B&HR 
claims concerning access to remedy and discuss the reasons for piercing the 
corporate veil in both areas. Using Chevron’s legal saga in Ecuador as a case study, 
this section exposes the differences in the two systems. Building on that comparison 
and with a view to improving access to remedy for B&HR claimants, we then propose 
a model for treaty-based veil piercing for B&HR claims, inspired by the IIL model. While 
there is already scholarship arguing that the corporate veil should be pierced in the 
context of human rights violations, we are advancing a novel mean of achieving this.   
 
II. Separate personality as an obstacle to access to effective judicial 
remedies by B&HR claimants 
 
Numerous attempts have been made to hold parent companies liable for human 
rights abuses committed overseas ostensibly by their subsidiaries.18 Claimants 
pursuing this route have frequently relied on causes of action in tort for personal injury, 
                                                          
argue that home state facilitation and promotion of overseas investment for the benefit of its corporate 
nationals by, inter alia, entering into investment treaties could contribute to the failure of the home state to 
protect human rights, when those corporations commit violations, by creating the conditions for adherence to 
lower standards.) 
15 Watered down commitments to ‘corporate social responsibility’ were made in a some recent investment 
treaties; See for instance, Article 15(2) of the 2014 Canada-Côte d’Ivoire Foreign Investment Promotion and 
Protection Agreement (Adopted 30 November 2014, entered into force 14 December 2015); So far, the strongest 
safeguards are found in Section 18 of the Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement between 
the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Morocco-
Nigeria BIT) Signed on 3 December 2016 
16 See Article 20 of the Morocco-Nigeria BIT. 
17 See Section VI(b) below. 
18 See n.4. 
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environmental harm, and emotional suffering.19 Victims have attempted to hold parent 
companies liable, sometimes jointly with their host state subsidiaries, before home 
state courts due to the lack of sufficient legal protections, including ineffective 
enforcement,20 in the host state and/or due to the subsidiary not having sufficient 
assets to satisfy a judgment.21 Particularly in the former instance, pursuing the parent 
company before the home state court might be the only effective path to a remedy. 
Litigating in a parent company’s home state is also sometimes seen as advantageous 
as it may open the door to favourable civil procedural arrangements such as class 
actions, public interest litigation, wide disclosure rules and sophisticated case funding 
arrangements, which make mounting this type of litigation feasible.22  
 
However, company law principles applicable in such cases render holding the 
parent company liable extremely difficult. The parent company is in law a distinct entity 
from the subsidiary. The act of incorporation creates a separate legal personality for 
the newly incorporated company, dividing it and its shareholder-owners into separate 
spheres and bestowing limited liability on the shareholders. The corporate veil with its 
corollary of limited liability, which divides the separate juridical personalities of parent 
and subsidiary company, is a device intended to protect shareholders so as to 
encourage risk-taking and innovation through investment in the business.23 It is 
important to bear in mind that the corporate veil operates in two directions. It has the 
effect of shielding shareholders from the liabilities of the company, but it also prevents 
shareholders from treating the rights held by the company as their own. It has been 
pointed out by leading scholars that the concept of limited liability originates from a 
time when corporations were generally not allowed to hold shares in other 
corporations, meaning that corporate groups did not exist.24 The use of the corporate 
veil to shield parent companies from liability for the debts of their subsidiaries in such 
groups ‘opens the door to multiple layers of insulation [from liability], a consequence 
                                                          
19 Lubbe v Cape plc [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 139 (CA); Bodo Community v Royal Dutch Shell Plc & Shell Petroleum 
Development Company (Nigeria) Ltd Case No HQ11X01280; Akpan v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC, 
Arrondissementsrechtbank Den Haag [District Court of The Hague], Jan. 30, 2013, Case No. C/09/337050/HA ZA 
09-1580 (ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:BY9854); Aguinda v Texaco, Inc 142 F Supp 2d 534 (SDNY 2001). 
20 G Skinner (n.11) 3 uses the concept ‘high risk country’; See also C van Dam, ‘Tort Law and Human Rights: 
Brothers in Arms On the Role of Tort Law in the Area of Business and Human Rights’ (2011) 2 JETL 221, 228; For 
example the local law may prohibit the type of claim. An example of such a law is the immunity law passed in 
Papua New Guinea to give Australian company BHP Billiton immunity from prosecution for environmental 
damage stemming from the construction of its gold and copper mine in the 1990s, see Sydney Morning Herald, 
PNG Government Takes Control of Ok Tedi Mine, 18 September 2013, www.smh.com.au/business/png-
government-takes-control-of-ok-tedi-mine-20130918-2tzt4.html; Another  example would be local law 
limitations on the compensation available e.g. as a result of a national workers' compensation scheme. 
21 The South African subsidiary of British company Cape plc was insolvent meaning that no claims could be 
brought against it by victims of asbestosis caused by the subsidiary in the case of Lubbe v Cape plc [2000] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 139 (CA); C van Dam, (n.20) 228. 
22 R Meeran, ‘Tort Litigation Against Multinationals for Violation of Human Rights: An Overview of the Position 
Outside the United States’, (2011) 3(1) City University Hong Kong Law Review 3, 13-19; C van Dam, (n.20) 228. 
23 S Joseph (n.5) 131. 
24 S Joseph, (n.5) 131 and P I Blumberg, ‘Accountability of Multinational Corporations: The Barriers Presented by 
Concepts of the Corporate Juridical Entity’ (2001) 24 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 297, 300-304. 
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unforeseen when limited liability was [first] adopted’25 and one which is arguably hard 
to justify, particularly in tort cases where the claimant is an involuntary creditor.26  
 
The circumstances in which the corporate veil may be pierced vary from state 
to state but, as a general rule, it is reserved for exceptional cases.27 A high threshold 
is set by domestic company laws to depart from the rule.28 Veil piercing may be 
considered where there has been fraud or where the level of control by the parent 
company is so extreme as to render the corporation an alter ego or a sham.29 As 
Michael Osborne explains, piercing the veil between an overseas subsidiary and its 
domestic parent company is made difficult by corporate law rules, and this ‘fiction of 
corporate personality facilitates elaborate shell games, permitting responsibility to be 
deferred, displaced and diffused across globe-spanning commercial empires.’30 It is 
possible to hold the parent company liable for its subsidiary’s actions without piercing 
the corporate veil by alleging, for example, that the parent company was directly 
involved in the violation ostensibly committed by its subsidiary.31 Attempts have been 
made to hold the parent directly liable in the home state for human rights harm caused 
by its subsidiary’s business on the grounds that the parent owed a direct duty of care 
to the victims.32 To our knowledge, so far there has not been a judicial determination 
holding a parent directly liable for overseas harm although there is English precedent 
for holding the parent directly liable in negligence for physical harm to an employee of 
its domestic subsidiary.33 The only judgment, to our knowledge, that pierced the veil 
to hold the parent liable for the human rights harm caused by the subsidiary was 
rendered by courts in Ecuador in a case brought against Chevron, discussed below.34  
 
There are typically three stages at which the corporate veil may interfere with 
access to a judicial remedy for B&HR claimants. The first is the jurisdictional stage. 
                                                          
25 P I. Blumberg, The Multinational Challenge to Corporate Law: The Search for a New Corporate Personality 
(OUP 1993) 139. 
26 P Muchlinski, ‘The Changing Face of Transnational Business Governance: Private Corporate Law Liability and 
Accountability of Transnational Groups in a Post-Financial Crisis World’ (2011) 18(2) Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 
665, 669-679 (Involuntary creditors are those that have been caused injury by the company without having 
entered into a bargain with the company over the allocation of risks). 
27 J Zerk, ‘Corporate liability for gross human rights abuses: Towards a fairer and more effective system of 
domestic law remedies’ A report prepared for the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 66, 
<www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/DomesticLawRemedies/StudyDomesticeLawRemedies.pdf> 
28 See for an overview of various jurisdictions K Vandekerckhove, Piercing the Corporate Veil (Kluwer Law 
International 2007). 
29 S Joseph, (n.5) 130. 
30 M Osborne, ‘Apartheid and the Alien Torts Act: Global Justice Meets Sovereign Equality’ in Max du Plessis and 
Stephen Pete, (eds), Repairing the Past? International Perspectives on Reparations for Gross Human Rights 
Abuses (Intersentia 2007), 241. 
31 See R Chambers and K Tyler, ‘The UK Context for Business and Human Rights’, in L Blecher, et al. (eds), 
Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights Impacts: New Expectations and Paradigms (American Bar Association 
2014) 304 and R Meeran, (n. 22) 5. 
32 For an overview of some of the attempts in England, see R Meeran (n. 22). 
33 See Chandler v Cape for a precedent holding the parent directly liable in negligence for physical harm to the 
employee of its domestic subsidiary. 
34 This case is explored below in Section V; Maria Aguinda et. al. v Chevron Corporation Lawsuit No. 2003-0002, 
Sucumbíos Provincial Court of Justice, judgment text available at 
<https://www.earthrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Lago-Agrio-judgment_0.pdf>; For a finding on the 
contrary, see Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1991] 1 All ER 929. 
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While the home state court might have personal jurisdiction over a parent company 
based on domicile, in order for it to assume subject-matter jurisdiction a claimant 
bringing a civil claim against a parent company will first have to show that there is 
sufficient link between the forum and the claim. This generally requires establishing a 
prima facie case against the parent for a violation committed by its subsidiary.35 
Formally, since the subsidiary and the parent company are separate legal persons, 
the latter may be able to benefit from a corporate veil defence. In common law 
countries, even where the court has jurisdiction over the case, it may nonetheless be 
struck out under the forum non conveniens rule if the court decides that there is a more 
appropriate forum elsewhere.36 The decision on whether there is a more appropriate 
forum might be influenced by the fact that the defendant parent company and its 
overseas subsidiary are separate entities. In European Union jurisdictions, Brussels 
Regulation (Recast)37 eliminates the availability of the forum non conveniens defence 
by allowing the parent company to be sued in the country where it is domiciled, without 
having to show that the home state is the most appropriate forum in which to hear the 
case. Nevertheless, the requirement to show a prima facie case against the parent 
remains, and might prevent home state courts from exercising jurisdiction over claims 
concerning subsidiary business.38 
 
The second stage, assuming the jurisdictional hurdle is overcome, is the merits 
stage where the court decides whether to disregard the corporate veil and to attribute 
liability to the parent company for harm caused by the subsidiary’s activities. The 
outcome of this is rarely positive for B&HR claimants.39 They have to tackle the almost 
impossible task of demonstrating that the parent created the subsidiary for fraudulent 
purposes, or that the subsidiary was the alter ego or agent of the parent. In direct 
parent liability cases claimants must prove that the parent owed a direct duty of care 
to them,40 and thus it was not the subsidiary’s breach alone that caused the harm, but 
                                                          
35 C van Dam, (n.20) 230 (“In order for the European forum to have jurisdiction a link is required between the 
forum and the claim. To establish this link the court may need to consider the merits of the claim at an early 
stage.”)  
36 In Recherches Internationales Quebec v Cambior Inc., unreported judgment of 14 August 1998 (Canada 
Superior Court, Quebec, no. 500-06-000034-971) the court dismissed proceedings brought by a public interest 
group against a Canadian mining company following the spill of cyanide contaminated tailings at a subsidiary 
mine’s site, on grounds of forum non conveniens. R Meeran, (n. 22) 11; S Joseph, (n.5) 88. 
37 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), 
published on the Official Journal of the European Union on 20.12.2012; Case C-281/02 Andrew Owusu v N.B. 
Jackson [2005] ECR I-1383. 
38 See His Royal Highness Emere Godwin Bebe Okpabi and Others v Royal Dutch Shell Plc 2017 EWHC 89 (TCC) 
para.69. 
39 Two patterns can be observed post-jurisdiction stage: (1) cases get settled out of court without admission of 
liability, See Lubbe v Cape Plc [2000] 1 WLR 1545 (HL) and Bodo Community v Royal Dutch Shell Plc & Shell 
Petroleum Development Company (Nigeria) Ltd Case No HQ11X01280; Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum 226 F 3d 
88 (2d Cir 2000);  (2) Parent company is not held liable on the merits, see Akpan v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC, 
Arrondissementsrechtbank Den Haag [District Court of The Hague], Jan. 30, 2013, Case No. C/09/337050/HA ZA 
09-1580 (ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:BY9854). 
40 For example Akpan ibid. See also, Chandler v Cape plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525, CSR Ltd v Wren (1997) 44 NSWLR 
463 (CA NSW). 
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also the parent’s breach of its own duty.41 This is difficult for claimants to do: the 
strictures of the corporate veil loom despite the fact that through the formulation of 
their legal claim, claimants do not actually seek to pierce it.42  
 
The third stage is the enforcement stage where the corporate veil might be an 
obstacle to a remedy. B&HR claimants might obtain a favourable judgment for 
damages in the host state against the subsidiary, but nevertheless be unable to 
enforce the judgment due to the subsidiary being impecunious or defunct. They might 
wish to enforce such a judgment against the parent, but they are likely to be 
unsuccessful as the corporate veil principle would prevent them from holding the 
parent liable for the debts of the subsidiary.  
 
III. IIL and Treaty-Based Veil Piercing: How does it operate? 
 
IIL deals with the substantive43 and procedural rights of foreign investors vis-a-
vis host states. Its primary sources include a web of bilateral, regional and sectoral 
investment treaties, the ICSID Convention and customary international law. The 
procedural empowerment of investors by the IIL instruments strengthens their access 
to remedies thus enabling the effective enforcement of substantive IIL protections.44 
But an entity must qualify as a foreign investor in order to benefit from IIL protections. 
Investors who desire the backing of ‘international law’ for their investments typically 
structure the corporate relationships involved in their investment in a way that will 
secure the protection of a strong investment treaty.45 
 
The ICSID Convention and investment treaties contain personal and material scope 
rules that allow direct or indirect shareholders or controllers of a host state subsidiary 
                                                          
41 In these instances, there seems to be a rebuttable presumption that the subsidiary is in charge of its own 
policies/activities, since it has separate personality from its shareholders/parent. In these circumstances, the 
parent does not owe a duty of care to the victims. But this presumption can be rebutted if the claimants can 
show, inter alia, that the parent company itself has disregarded the corporate veil and has taken charge 
of/controlled certain policies/activities of the subsidiary, thus assuming a direct duty of care towards the victims. 
Rebuttal of this presumption allows for the court to hold the parent directly liable under the relevant civil liability 
principles. The threshold for rebutting this presumption by showing that the necessary level of involvement 
exists is a high one. 
42 This was successfully done in Chandler v Cape plc. Arden LJ explicitly noted that the case was not about veil-
piercing, para. 69; however, it is possible to argue that in effect the decision disregarded the separation between 
the parent and the subsidiary where certain conditions were met; the claimants in Akpan (n. 39) were unable to 
convince the court to find a direct duty of care on the parent, as the latter was a separate entity and did not 
satisfy the conditions set by the court in the Chandler judgment.  
43 Substantive rights guaranteed typically include national treatment and most favoured nation treatment 
clauses, right to compensation for expropriation of investment, right to a fair and equitable treatment, the right 
to receive full protection and security and free transfer of funds. 
44 Procedural rights contained in investment treaties typically include a right to settle disputes with the host 
state before an international arbitration tribunal. 
45 See R van Os and R Knottnerus, Dutch Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Gateway to ‘treaty shopping’ for 
investment protection by multinational companies (October 2011) SOMO 9 (defines treaty shopping as “the 
conduct of foreign investors in acquiring the benefits of investment treaties in their actual or planned host state 
through third countries, through which their investment needs to be routed.”); E Zuleta et al., ‘Treaty Planning: 
Current Trends in International Investment Disputes that Impact Foreign Investment Decisions and Treaty 
Drafting’ in M A Fernandez-Ballesteros and D Arias (eds) Liber Amicorum Bernardo Cremades (La Ley 2010). 
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to bring claims against the host state for the harm caused by the latter to the 
subsidiary’s business. These treaty provisions allow investment tribunals, for the 
purposes of determining their jurisdiction and the personal scope of application of an 
investment treaty,46 to disregard the separate personality between the host state entity 
and its shareholders without having to justify this under the limited domestic law 
grounds for lifting the corporate veil. This is what we call a ‘treaty-based reverse veil 
piercing’. Treaty provisions allow the veil or veils of a number of entities to be 
disregarded to enable the direct or indirect shareholders or controllers to advance a 
claim which would, under the company law rules on separate personality, have 
belonged to the local subsidiary. 
A. The ICSID Convention  
 
The ICSID Convention47 uses ‘nationality’ as the criterion for determining the personal 
scope of jurisdiction. To benefit from the dispute settlement framework created by the 
Convention, a corporate investor must be a foreign national. For corporate investors, 
which make up the vast majority of IIL claimants, the Convention envisages two 
scenarios for determination of foreign nationality: (1) corporate investors that invest 
without a separately incorporated local subsidiary are treated as ‘foreign’, and (2) 
corporate investors that operate in the host state via a local subsidiary are prima facie 
treated as domestic, but can be treated as foreign if the local subsidiary is ‘controlled’ 
by a foreign entity.48 The latter type is the more common method of foreign investment, 
and it is the treatment of this type of investment that falls within the scope of this article.  
 
Though Article 25(2)(b) stipulates the application of a ‘control’ test to determine 
the nationality of the host state entity, it does not clarify what is meant by ‘control’. The 
meaning of ‘control’ has been interpreted in various arbitral awards.49 The significance 
                                                          
46 The merits of the claim, and what states can be held liable for under the applicable investment treaty, contract, 
or legislation is a separate question and will be determined with reference to the substantive provisions of the 
applicable instrument.  
47 The ICSID Convention concerns only the procedural rights of investors. It sets up a legal framework for the 
settlement of investment disputes between investors and host states, using international arbitration as the 
primary method of dispute resolution. Conciliation is also provided in the Convention, but not used often. 
48 Article 25 (2) “National of another Contracting State” means: (b) any juridical person which had the nationality 
of a Contracting State other than the State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to 
submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration and any juridical person which had the nationality of the 
Contracting State party to the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control, the parties have 
agreed should be treated as a national of another Contracting State for the purposes of this Convention.” 
Consent (which may be inferred) is the other requirement under this Article for a local corporation to be treated 
as possessing the nationality of the relevant contracting state. 
49 See for instance, Quiborax S.A., Non Metallic Minerals S.A. and Allan Fosk Kaplún v Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, (Decision on Jurisdiction) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal Case No.ARB/06/2, 27 September 2012) para.195; AES 
Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v The Republic of Hungary (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal 
Case No.ARB/07/22, 23 September 2010) paras.6.1.4-6.1.6; Millicom International Operations BV and Sentel 
GSM SA (Sentel) v The Republic of Senegal (Senegal) (Decision on Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal) (ICSID 
Arbitral Tribunal Case No.ARB/08/20, 16 July 2010), para.109; Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide 
v Republic of the Philippines (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal Case No.ARB/03/25, 16 August 2007); Tidewater 
Inc, Tidewater Investment SRL, Tidewater Caribe, CA, Twenty Grand Offshore, LLC, Point Marine, LLC, Twenty 
Grand Marine Service, LLC, Jackson Marine, LLC, Zapata Gulf Marine Operators, LLC (Tidewater) v The Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela (Venezuela) (Decision on Jurisdiction) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No ARB/10/5, 8 
February 2013). 
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of this part of Article 25(2)(b) is that it looks behind the corporate veil of the host state 
subsidiary, for the purpose of determining the foreign nationality of the investor, 
without having to justify this under the limited domestic company law grounds for lifting 
the corporate veil.  
 
B. Investment treaties 
 
An investor falling under the personal scope of an investment treaty, provided temporal 
and material requirements are also satisfied, will be able to benefit from the 
substantive protections of the treaty and enforce these under the dispute settlement 
provisions of the treaty.50 For corporate investors, an overwhelming majority of treaties 
refer, as the determinant of personal scope, to criteria such as place of incorporation, 
seat or centre of management.51 Occasionally, bilateral investment treaties (‘BITs’) 
refer directly to the ‘nationality’ of corporate investors in order to determine personal 
scope, but nationality is determined by reference to criteria such as place of 
incorporation, seat or centre of management.52  
 
If the investment in the host state is carried out through a local subsidiary, 
reverse veil piercing allows the shareholder/parent company established in the home 
state to claim in the place of its subsidiary. Most investment treaties allow the direct or 
indirect controllers to benefit from the treaty’s protections, so long as the controllers 
fall within the personal scope of the treaty, i.e. they are nationals/companies of the 
home contracting state. In this way a parent company is able to bring a treaty claim 
against the host state for the harm suffered by its subsidiary. Many investment treaties 
also include within their material scope direct or indirect ownership of shares as 
‘investment’, which makes it possible for minority shareholders to advance claims for 
the harm they suffered as the subsidiary’s shareholders, de facto disregarding 
separate personality.53 This way, what might otherwise be characterised as a domestic 
dispute between the subsidiary and the host state is transformed into an international 
investment dispute that attracts the protection of an investment treaty. 
 
                                                          
50 If the treaty provides for it, the investment treaty claim might be brought under the ICSID Convention or under 
another arbitral procedure. As such, the investment treaty constitutes the consent of the disputing parties to 
ICSID arbitration. The host State making a standing offer to arbitrate to home State investors by entering into 
the treaty. This standing offer can be accepted by the home State investor by initiating the arbitral proceedings. 
51 See for instance, Article 1 of the Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Serbia for the Promotion 
and Protection of Investments (adopted 01 September 2014, entered into force 27 April 2015) 
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/35/treaty/3502>; For a detailed analysis of investment 
treaty trends see, Scope and Definition: A Sequel, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements II (28 February 2011) UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2010/2, 80-84. 
52 See for instance, Article 1(b) of the Agreement on promotion and protection of investments between the 
Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain (Adopted 05 
February 2007, entered into force 01 December 2009) 2649 UNTS 13. 
53 See for instance, Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction) 
(ICSID Arbitral Tribunal Case No.ARB01/3, 14 January 2004) (The investor held 35.263% interest in the local 
business); CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Republic of Argentina, (Decision of the Tribunal on Objections 
to Jurisdiction) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal Case No.ARB/01/8, 17 July 2003) (The investor held 29.42% in the local 
business).  
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For instance, in the US-Ecuador BIT54 reverse veil piercing is made possible by 
a number of provisions of the treaty. A ‘company’ that has an ‘investment’ in Ecuador 
is able to benefit from the investment treaty protections, including the right to bring 
arbitration proceedings against the host state.55 Pursuant to Article 1(a), ‘investment’ 
includes investments ‘owned or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals or 
companies of the [home state]’. The investment itself could take the form of ‘a 
company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or interests in the assets 
thereof’. This covers investments that are owned directly or indirectly by the protected 
investor and take the form of a company, i.e. a subsidiary, established in the host 
state.  
 
Article 1(b) defines ‘company’ as one which is ‘legally constituted under the 
laws and regulations of a Party’. The commentary attached to the treaty explains that 
the word ‘company’ should be interpreted flexibly so as to afford protection ‘even if the 
parent company is ultimately owned by non-Party nationals’56 or even where the 
investment is made by ‘a company of a third country that is owned or controlled by 
nationals or companies of a Party.’ The flexible interpretation envisaged in the 
commentary allows a corporate group to utilise the existence of the parent or a 
subsidiary in a particular jurisdiction for the benefit of the whole group, no matter which 
particular entity is carrying out the investment in the host state or no matter which 
particular entity directly holds shares in that subsidiary, so long as that entity is within 
the upstream ownership structure of the host state subsidiary. In this way, corporate 
veils can be disregarded throughout the various layers of the group structure.  
  
C.  ‘Control’ under IIL 
 
The ICSID Convention does not provide guidance on the meaning of ‘control’. Some 
investment treaties, like the US-Ecuador BIT, refer to ‘direct or indirect’ control and 
ownership as descriptors, but this is very limited guidance. Other investment treaties,57 
like the Hong Kong-Australia BIT, go one step further and define control by reference 
to holding a ‘substantial interest’ in the subsidiary.58 In the absence of clear guidance 
from treaties, one might turn to the arbitral awards applying and interpreting them for 
answers. Tribunals tackle two main issues when deciding who the investor behind the 
host state entity is. The first concerns the indicators of control. So far, 
                                                          
54 Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment (Adopted, 27 August 1993, entered into force 11 May 1997) 
55 Ibid, Article 6. 
56 “although the other Party may deny the benefits of the Treaty in the limited circumstances” provided in Article 
1(2) 
57 Some investment treaties provide limitations to the meaning of control by way of denial of benefits clauses 
See for instance, art 17 of the Energy Charter Treaty (Adopted 17 December 1994, entered into force 16 April 
1998) 2080 UNTS 95; Some treaties contain a vague definition like Article 1(d) of the Agreement on Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of 
Turkey (Adopted 27 March 1986, entered into force 01 November 1989); Others remain silent like the 
Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and Georgia on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments(Adopted 03 June 2014, entered into force  17 April 2015), 
58 Article 1(e) of the Agreement between the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of Australia for 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments; The meaning of ‘substantial interest’ is not provided in the treaty. 
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ownership/shareholding, voting rights, management rights59 and capital investment60 
in the host state entity have been considered when determining the identity of the 
controller. Tribunals most frequently consider share ownership as an indicator of 
control.61 The second issue concerns when shareholding is taken as an indicator of 
control and the host state entity’s upstream ownership structure is formed of multiple 
layers. In such cases, the question arises as to which entity or person exercises 
‘control’ over the host state entity within the meaning of the applicable treaty. Is 
‘control’ exercised by the immediate shareholders62 of the host state entity or is there 
a need to look beyond the immediate shareholders in the upstream structure to identify 
the controllers? In the latter case, is it necessary to identify the entity exercising actual 
day to day control? Or, could the tribunal attribute control to an entity within the 
upstream ownership of the host state company that legally has the ability to exercise 
control, regardless of the level of its involvement in the subsidiary’s business 
operations?  
  
A common feature we observed from arbitral awards is that IIL tribunals do not 
search for day-to-day control of the subsidiary, in order to attribute the ‘protected 
investor’ status to a direct or an indirect shareholder under the applicable treaty. There 
is, however, a diversity of approaches in what level of involvement is required short of 
day-to-day control. In some cases, tribunals have sought to identify whether the 
shareholder that claims to be the investor is a genuine entity that has the ability to 
exercise control over the subsidiary, and not a shell holding company.63 Other tribunals 
have considered the ‘potential’ to exercise control via ownership/shareholding 
sufficient,64 even where the entity invoking the investor status is a shell holding 
company established in a jurisdiction with a favourable investment treaty with the host 
state.65 These latter claims are brought by a shell holding company as the ‘controlling 
entity’, which is in turn owned directly or indirectly by a parent company established in 
a country that has not signed an investment treaty with the host state. Since these 
shell entities are mere vehicles with no actual activities, their ability to exercise ‘control’ 
is doubtful. This so called practice of treaty shopping via shell companies has led some 
                                                          
59 Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation (LETCO) v Republic of Liberia (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal Case 
No.ARB/83/2, 31 March 1986) French translation of English original in 115 Journal du droit international 167 
(1988) (excerpts). 
60 Dissenting opinion of Prosper Weil in Tokios Tokelés v Ukraine (Decision on Jurisdiction) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal 
Case No.ARB/02/18, 29 April 2004). 
61 See Quiborax S.A., Non Metallic Minerals S.A. and Allan Fosk Kaplún v Plurinational State of Bolivia (Decision 
on Jurisdiction) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal Case No.ARB/06/2, 27 September 2012) para. 195. 
62 See Amco Asia Corporation and others v. Republic of Indonesia (Decision on Jurisdiction) (ICSID Arbitral 
Tribunal Case No.ARB/81/1, 25 September 1983) 23 ILM 351 (1984). 
63 Banro American Resources, Inc. and Société Aurifère du Kivu et du Maniema S.A.R.L. (Banro American) v 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal Case No.ARB/98/7, 1 September 2000) 
Excerpts of the award published on 17 ICSID Rev. – FILJ 382 (2002); TSA Spectrum de Argentina S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal Case No.ARB/05/5, 19 December 2008); Standard Chartered Bank v 
United Republic of Tanzania (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal Case No.ARB/10/12, 2 November 2012) para.200; 
Burimi SRL and Eagle Games SH.A v. Republic of Albania (Award) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal Case No.ARB/11/18, 29 
May 2013) paras. 115-121.  
64 See Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela C A v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Decision on Jurisdiction) 
(ICSID Arbitral Tribunal Case No.ARB/00/5, 27 September 2001) (The potential to control was found sufficient.)  
65 See Mobil Corporation, Venezuela Holdings, B.V., Mobil Cerro Negro Holding, Ltd., Mobil Venezolana de 
Petróleos Holdings, Inc., Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd., and Mobil Venezolana de Petróleos, Inc. v. Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela (Decision on Jurisdiction) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal Case No.ARB/07/27, 10 June 2010). 
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scholars to argue that tribunals should look beyond formalistic appearances and pay 
due regard to economic realities when assessing control under IIL in order to prevent 
exploitation of the protection mechanism, an approach that we agree with.66 The 
awards that support this approach also do not hesitate to look beyond the corporate 
veils of any entity in the upstream ownership structure of the host state subsidiary to 
identify the entity which is genuinely able to exercise legal control over the 
investment.67  
 
 It is difficult to make generalizations as to the meaning of control under IIL due 
to the diversity of the applicable legal instruments and the diversity in the approaches 
of arbitral tribunals. In our proposal, we borrow the one common feature of control 
present in all the awards we have reviewed: when international investment arbitration 
(‘IIA’) tribunals determine the personal scope of their jurisdiction through a search for 
the controllers, they deviate from the tight level of control required by the traditional 
rules on piercing the corporate veil. The IIL model does not look for a heightened 
involvement of the controllers in the subsidiary’s business. At most, IIL requires the 
controllers to be a genuine entity, and not a shell holding company, acting as the 
economic force behind the local subsidiary with an ability to provide a general direction 
to the subsidiary’s business. The permissive language used in BITs and interpretations 
adopted by IIA tribunals demonstrate that the threshold of control required by IIL to 
trigger treaty-based veil piercing is significantly lower than that which is typically 
required by domestic law as grounds for piercing the veil in B&HR claims. It is the 
model of treaty-based veil piercing and this permissive approach to control under IIL 
that we aim to borrow from the IIL remedial regime for a treaty based veil piercing in 
B&HR claims involving transnational businesses. Building on this permissive treaty-
based approach, for purposes of increasing legal certainty, our model contains a clear 
definition of control.   
 
IV. Comparing the position of foreign investors with B&HR claimants  
The corporate veil can pose an obstacle to access to remedy for both B&HR claimants 
and foreign investors. We argue that an exception to the separate personality rule 
should be carved out for B&HR claimants under international human rights law 
(‘IHRL’), similar to the exception carved out for the protection of investors under IIL. It 
is useful to draw appropriate analogies from more established areas of law in order to 
                                                          
66 C H Schreuer et al, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2nd edition Cambridge University Press 2009) 323; 
M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (3rd edition, Cambridge University Press 2010) 327-
328. 
67 Banro American v DRC (Award) para.7 (the tribunal stressed that control would not be decided on formal 
appearances, but it also did not seek a high level of involvement by the parent in the subsidiary’s business in 
order to determine who the ‘investor’ is. The tribunal chose to look behind the veil of the various subsidiaries 
holding shares in the local subsidiary ‘to reveal the parent company as the actual Claimant’ thereby ‘allowing 
the financial reality to prevail over legal structures.’); In SOABI v Senegal the tribunal held that the Convention 
was not solely concerned with the direct control of the local entity by its immediate shareholders. It was natural 
that investors may choose to channel their investments “through intermediary entities while retaining the same 
degree of control over the national company as they would have exercised as direct shareholders of the latter. 
See Société Ouest Africaine des Bétons Industriels (SOABI) v. State of Senegal (Decision on Jurisdiction) (ICSID 
Arbitral Tribunal Case No.ARB/82/1, 1 August 1984) 2 ICSID Reports 165(1994) paras.35-37. 
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develop solutions to particular challenges in newly emerging areas of law.68 Although 
IIL itself is an emerging area of law, B&HR is an even younger field which can benefit 
from being analogised to the more established principles of the IIL regime. They share 
a sufficient number of relevant characteristics69 that allow us to draw certain analogies 
between the treatments of corporate veil in these fields.70  
Most generally, IIL protections have been developed with the underlying 
assumption that foreign investors are in a position of vulnerability vis-à-vis host states 
and, therefore, they need substantive and procedural rights guaranteed under 
international law.71 B&HR claimants are arguably in an even more vulnerable position 
in relation to transnational businesses in defending their basic rights and they strongly 
deserve substantive and procedural support of international law. States often include 
procedural guarantees in their investment treaties to enhance access to remedies for 
investors. Under the IHRL framework, states have a duty to protect against abuses by 
third parties, including business enterprises. As part of this duty, they are required to 
establish effective remedy mechanisms when third party abuses occur. IIL and B&HR 
both have a strong emphasis on access to remedy to safeguard the basic rights of 
their respective beneficiaries.  
Besides the relative disadvantaged position of these two sets of defendants, 
having the fragmented transnational business enterprise as a key actor in both 
domains necessitates veil piercing in order to enhance access to remedies for their 
beneficiaries. IIL has effectively dealt with this issue by introducing treaty-based veil 
piercing, which we argue below is a constructive example to follow in dealing with the 
same challenge in the B&HR context. Given that lack of access to remedies for 
individual victims is a problem in the IHRL context,72 a similar approach to IIL can be 
taken by states to assist in fulfilling their duty to provide access to effective remedies 
to B&HR claimants harmed by transnational business activity.  
 IIL grants unique treaty-based rights to foreign investors and treaty-based veil-
piercing contributes to the effective enforcement of these rights. Internationally 
                                                          
68 This is explained by A Roberts in her work on analogies drawn to develop IIL. She states that “[w]hen a field is 
young, it is common for many issues to remain unresolved, leading participants to draw analogies with more 
established legal disciplines in seeking to provide content and form to the new field.” A Roberts, ‘Clash of 
Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System’ (2013) 107 AJIL 45, 50.  
69 IHRL and IIL both aim to protect fundamental rights of private parties against state abuse, require states to 
provide protection against unjustified third-party interference with rights, and enhance access to justice when 
such abuses are committed by states and by third parties. Both areas enjoin states from invoking their national 
law to justify violations of their respective rules; and both areas have treaty frameworks that allow private 
parties to bring a treaty claim against the state directly; See, A Roberts, (n.68) pp. 69-75; P M Dupuy and J E 
Vinuales, ‘Human Rights and Investment Disciplines: Integration in Progress’  in M. Bungenberg et. al. (eds), 
International Investment Law (Nomos, 2015), 15. 
70 There are some fundamental differences between these two areas, the primary one being the identity of the 
defendants, but we do not view these as relevant to the treatment of corporate veil; C R Sunstein, ‘On Analogical 
Reasoning’ (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 741, 745 (For analogical reasoning to operate properly, we have to 
know that A and B are “relevantly” similar, and that there are not “relevant” differences between them… The 
major challenge facing analogical reasoners is to decide when differences are relevant.) 
71 C Schreuer, ‘Do We Need Investment Arbitration?’, in J E Kalicki and A Joubin-Bret (eds) reshaping the Investor-
State Dispute Settlement System: Journeys for the 21st Century (Brill Nijhoff 2015). 
72 Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press 2006) pp.1-4. 
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guaranteed substantive and procedural rights73 are viewed as safeguards against host 
states that have the power to detrimentally alter the substantive legal framework 
applicable to an investment or fail to afford effective judicial protection to investors. 
Treaty-based veil piercing is an important pillar of the procedural empowerment of 
foreign investors, allowing them to present claims before arbitral tribunals which would 
have, under the principle of separate personality, belonged to their subsidiaries and 
been litigated in host state courts.74 The IIL rules on treaty based veil piercing 
maximize the number of foreign investors that can benefit from IIL protections.  
In the B&HR context, claimants are in a similarly disadvantageous position in 
relation to transnational corporations, both substantively and procedurally. The lack of 
binding IHRL obligations for businesses, weak legal standards and weak enforcement 
in host states necessitate unique rights for B&HR claimants, to be codified in an 
international treaty accompanied with treaty-based veil piercing, in the same way that 
foreign investors have unique rights against host states. Procedurally, there is a similar 
lack of confidence in the ability of victims to obtain effective remedies locally,75 and 
save for exceptional circumstances, B&HR claimants are unable to reach the pockets 
of the parent company due to the latter being a separate person from its local 
subsidiary. Both types of dispute usually involve a local subsidiary carrying out 
business in the host state and a parent company based in the home state holding the 
shares of the local subsidiary, sometimes indirectly through a complex upstream 
corporate structure. In both cases, the local subsidiary is usually directly linked to the 
violation, but the parent company might not be. In investment cases, it would be the 
local subsidiary's property that has been expropriated or licence that has been 
cancelled. In B&HR claims, it is the local subsidiary's activities that ostensibly cause 
the harm suffered by the victims. In both fields, the question arises as to whether the 
parent company should be a party to the dispute in lieu of or in addition to its subsidiary 
in a transnational context, and thus benefit from or suffer the consequences of the 
judgment or award made. When considering these similarities in corporate structures 
involved, we should bear in mind that it is often the same transnational businesses 
that benefit from IIL protections that act as defendants in the type of B&HR claims 
addressed here.76  
 
 
                                                          
73 See for instance, M Waibel, ‘Investment Arbitration: Jurisdiction and Admissibility’ (2014) University of 
Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 9/2014, 5, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2391789> (“…access to impartial fora is seen as essential 
to the realisation of the substantive legal obligations that States have undertaken…”) 
74 Availability of investment arbitration and the financial ability of the investors to pursue IIL claims are the other 
important factors. 
75 UNGPs Principle 26’s commentary lists among the legal barriers to access to remedy potential denial of justice 
in a host State and inability access home state courts; P Simons and A Macklin, The Governance Gap: Extractive 
Industries, Human Rights, and the Home State Advantage (Routledge 2014) 6 (State that ‘a large proportion of 
corporate human rights violations take place in developing states’, where access to remedies might be 
challenging; See also, D Shelton, ‘Normative Evolution in Corporate Liability for Violations of Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law’, (2010) 15 Austrian Review of International and European Law 45-88, 54-55 
76 H Ward, ‘Governing Multinationals: The Role of Foreign Direct Liability’ (2001) Royal Institute of International 
Affairs Briefing Paper New Series No.18, 1 
<www.iatp.org/files/Governing_Multinationals_The_Role_of_Foreign_D.pdf> (Ward describes ‘foreign direct 
liability’ claims for human rights harm as the ‘flip side of foreign direct investment’.) 
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The similarities in the corporate structures and relationships involved in the 
B&HR and IIL claims make the IIL approach to veil piercing a suitable model for B&HR 
claims. A main difference between IIL and B&HR in this respect is that in IIL veil 
piercing allows the parent to benefit from the award, while in B&HR it would make the 
parent suffer the consequences of the judgment.  At this point, it is important to 
remember that corporate veil operates in two directions. It has the effect of shielding 
shareholders from the liabilities of the company, but it also prevents shareholders from 
treating the rights held by the company as their own. IIL introduces an exception to 
this general rule by allowing shareholders to advance claims against host states for 
abuses suffered by the local subsidiary, a right that is normally reserved for the local 
subsidiary. The same economic realities and structures of transnational business 
affect access to remedy in both domains. In both instances, the availability of veil 
piercing determines whether the case can be heard by a court or a tribunal outside the 
host state’s legal system and whether it can proceed with the parent company acting 
as a party to the dispute instead of its subsidiary. While the defendants and claimants 
in these two types of claim are different, and under IIL it is the state that assumes the 
obligations under the treaty, in essence, IIL treaties are entered into by states and 
create enforceable rights for private parties. The framework we propose here 
envisages a similar arrangement, under which states would sign up to treaty 
commitments to create rights enforceable by B&HR claimants before domestic courts 
of the home state.77 We argue here that policy-makers should not shy away from 
introducing a principled exception to the corporate veil principle to fulfil their duty to 
protect human rights, even if this means extending liabilities of companies.  
The underlying reason behind IIL taking a more lenient approach to corporate 
veil is because of its having a different objective: extending rights for claimant 
companies rather than liabilities for defendant companies with a view to encouraging 
economic activity and risk-taking. There appears to be a heightened desire by policy-
makers to protect economic activity compared to the desire to protect human rights. 
There is openness to disregarding corporate veil to protect market interests, but 
extreme caution when it comes to the protection of human rights. This is paradoxically 
exemplified by looking at how the goals of IIL exceptions on corporate veil and the 
company law rules on corporate veil overlap, as they both intend to increase economic 
activity by facilitating risk taking by investors.78 There is an eagerness to introduce 
rules and exceptions necessary to protect investment whilst placing lesser importance 
on improving human rights protection against business abuses. We argue that the 
protection of human rights is a policy goal at least as worthy as the promotion of 
economic activity meaning that, on occasion, the latter should be subjugated to the 
former.   
 
V. Chevron in Ecuador: the Double Standard Comes to Light 
 
                                                          
77 See Section VI(C) below. 
78 In the company law context for corporate veil rules, this is done by primarily shielding investors from the risk 
of certain damages claims; and in the investment context by protecting investors from certain host state risks.  
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The inconsistency outlined above is clearly illustrated in the legal saga involving 
Chevron’s activities (formerly Texaco)79 in Ecuador. The main actors of this legal saga 
are Chevron, Ecuador and the residents in Ecuador’s Oriente region. Accounts of 
Chevron’s ‘lawfare’ in Ecuador have been provided in numerous publications,80 and 
will not be repeated here in detail. For the purposes of this paper, we will group the 
claims into two categories. The first group involves those brought by the residents 
against Chevron (beginning in the US, continuing in the courts of Ecuador, and now 
seeking enforcement around the world, including in Canada,81 Argentina82 and 
Brazil83) seeking damages for personal injuries suffered as a result of Texaco’s 
operations in the region.84 These consist of infringements of the right to health, right 
to a healthy environment, right to water, right to food and indigenous rights such as 
land rights, cultural rights and consultation rights.85 The second group consists of the 
investment treaty claim that was brought before an arbitral tribunal by Chevron against 
Ecuador under the US-Ecuador BIT seeking compensation for the latter’s violation of 
provisions of the BIT arising from, inter alia, denial of justice in the Lago Agrio86 
litigation.  
 
The first group of actions brought against Chevron for environmental and health 
damage by the Ecuadorian victims include the initial Aguinda87 litigation in the US, 
followed by the Lago Agrio litigation in Ecuador, and the Yaiguaje88 enforcement action 
in Canada.  In each of these proceedings, Chevron has argued that it is a separate 
entity from its subsidiary TexPet, whose activities allegedly caused the harm, and 
TexPet’s former parent Texaco Inc., and thus cannot be held liable for the harms in 
question. The initial lawsuit was filed in 1993 in the US.89 The plaintiffs argued that the 
                                                          
79 Chevron and Texaco joined forces in 2001 through a merger. It was Texaco that operated in Ecuador through 
its subsidiary TexPet until 1992; See the announcement on the completion of the merger 
<www.chevron.com/stories/chevrontexaco-corporation-announces-completion-of-merger> 
80 See for instance, S Joseph, ‘Protracted lawfare: the tale of Chevron Texaco in the Amazon’, (2012) 3(1) Journal 
of Human Rights and the Environment 70-91; J Kimerling, ‘Indigenous Peoples and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia: 
The Case of Ecuador Chevron Texaco, and Aguinda v. Texaco’, (2006) 38 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 413; S Patel, 
‘Delayed Justice: A Case Study of Texaco and the Republic of Ecuador’s Operations, Harms and Possible Redress 
in the Ecuadorian Amazon’, (2012-2013) 22 Tulane Environmental Law Journal 71; C Giorgetti, ‘Mass Tort Claims 
in International Investment Proceedings: What are the Lessons from the Ecuador-Chevron Dispute?’ (2012-
2013) 34 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 787  
81 Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corp, 2013 ONCA 758; Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje, 2015 SCC 42, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 
82 E Garcia and A Valencia, ‘Ecuador plaintiffs to file lawsuit against Chevron in Argentina’ Reuters (Quito, 31 
October 2012) <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecuador-chevron-idUSBRE89U18D20121031> accessed 12 
January 2017. 
83 E Garcia, ‘Ecuador plaintiffs target Chevron’s assets in Brazil’ Reuters (Quito, 28 June 2012)  
<http://in.reuters.com/article/ecuador-chevron-idINL2E8HRJX920120628> accessed 12 January 2017. 
84 Texaco operated in the region as part of a consortium in which it held 37.5% stake for the last two decades of 
its activity in the area. It was the operator of the consortium. See J Kimerling, (n. 80) 420 fn.17. 
85 C Jochnick and N Rabaeus, (n. 14) 433. 
86 Maria Aguinda et. al. v Chevron Corporation Lawsuit No. 2003-0002, Sucumbíos Provincial Court of Justice, 
judgment text available at <https://www.earthrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Lago-Agrio-
judgment_0.pdf>  
87 Aguinda v Texaco 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (SDNY 2001). 
88 Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corp, 2013 ONCA 758; Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje, 2015 SCC 42, [2015] 3 S.C.R.  
89 Aguinda v Texaco 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (SDNY 2001) (Among the reasons for filing the claim in the US, the 
claimants argued (to fight off the FNC claim) that class actions were not available in Ecuador, that there were 
procedural deficiencies, there was a need for protracted administrative proceedings prior to the suit, discovery 
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true site of the alleged environmental torts was the US, as the relevant policy decisions 
had been made at Texaco’s US headquarters. The District Court dismissed the case 
on forum non conveniens grounds, finding that ‘a meaningful nexus between the 
United States and the decisions and practices’ which formed the subject of the case 
was missing.90 In Jota v Texaco91, the appeal before the Second Circuit, Texaco 
elaborated its motion to dismiss the action on forum non conveniens grounds with 
reference, inter alia, to the legal separation between itself and TexPet.92 Similarly in 
Aguinda v Texaco93 the District Court dismissed the claim on forum non conveniens 
grounds. It held, inter alia, that ‘only conduct arguably involving sued oil company was 
participation by fourth tier subsidiary, not joined as party, in consortium causing 
damages, with most of subsidiary's activities occurring in Ecuador.’ The court found 
no direct involvement of Texaco parent in the operations of the subsidiary in Ecuador 
which would warrant disregarding the separate personality between the entities and 
proceeding to the merits of the claim against Texaco. The DC conditioned the 
dismissal on Texaco consenting to submit to personal jurisdiction in Ecuador and to 
waive the relevant statute of limitations.94  
 
Following the dismissal in the US, the Lago Agrio action was brought in Ecuador 
in 2003 against Chevron and TexPet.95 In this litigation, Chevron raised two objections 
to the Ecuadorian court’s jurisdiction that relate to the corporate veil.96 First, it claimed 
that it was not a legitimate defendant as it was not the successor of Texaco Inc., 
therefore, it could not succeed to Texaco’s liabilities, including the latter’s obligation to 
submit to the jurisdiction of the Ecuadoran courts as per the Aguinda judgment.97 
Second, even if it was treated as the successor of Texaco Inc., it was a separate entity 
from TexPet, thus could not be held liable for the alleged harm caused by its 
subsidiary. Both objections were dismissed by the court, a rare occasion.  
 
The second objection on separate personality is useful in illustrating the 
inconsistency discussed in this paper. Here, Chevron argued that it has never had 
operations in Ecuador, and TexPet was a separate entity whose liabilities could not be 
attributed to it. The court stated in respect of this defence that it would need to evaluate 
                                                          
restrictions, cross-examination restrictions and the tendency to have court appointed experts. They also claimed 
that Ecuador had no comparable procedure to grant plaintiffs the equitable remedy they are principally seeking.) 
90 Aguinda v Texaco 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (SDNY 2001), 13(“The record before the Court also clearly establishes 
that all of the Consortium’s key activities, including decisions and practices here at issue, were managed, 
directed, and conducted by Consortium employees in Ecuador. By contrast, no one from Texaco or, indeed, 
anyone else operating in the United States, made any material decisions as to the consortium’s activities and 
practices that are at issue here.”) 
91 Jota v Texaco Inc 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir., 10/05/1998). 
92 Ibid. (“Texaco had participated in oil drilling in Ecuador exclusively through its fourth-level subsidiary, Texaco 
Petroleum Company (“TexPet”)).” 
93 Aguinda v Texaco 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (SDNY 2001). 
94 Aguinda v Texaco 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (SDNY 2001). 
95 Chevron Corporation acquired Texaco in 2001. 
96 Maria Aguinda et. al. v Chevron Corporation (n.86); S Joseph ‘Protracted lawfare: the tale of Chevron Texaco 
in the Amazon’ (n.80), 75. 
97 This was based on the fact that Chevron acquired Texaco via a reverse triangular merger, whereby Chevron 
created a subsidiary called Keepap Inc. which merged with Texaco, and the latter continues to exist as a separate 
legal entity and a subsidiary of Chevron. The Court rejected the claim and held that the real effect of the 
transaction behind the formal appearances was a de facto merger between Chevron and Texaco; See Maria 
Aguinda et. al. v Chevron Corporation (n.86). 
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whether grounds for lifting the corporate veil existed in order to hold Texaco (and its 
successor Chevron) liable. At the outset of its assessment, the court emphasised that 
veil piercing was limited to exceptional situations, such as undercapitalisation of the 
subsidiary to the detriment of third parties and excessive control and involvement over 
the subsidiary’s business that makes the latter the alter ego of the parent. The court 
held that TexPet could not be considered a distinct legal entity from Texaco (Chevron) 
as all TexPet’s business, financial and technical decisions were made by Texaco. It 
sought authorisation from the parent for the simplest day-to-day running of the 
company. Furthermore, TexPet was left undercapitalised by Texaco and was unable 
to meet its obligations. For these reasons, the court sanctioned the piercing of the 
layers of veil between Chevron and TexPet, as not doing so would cause a manifest 
injustice. The outcome of the court’s interpretation of the traditional veil piercing 
doctrine here in relation to the Texaco-TexPet-Chevron constellation is an exceptional 
one.    
 
The Lago Agrio plaintiffs obtained a judgment against Chevron from Ecuadoran 
courts in the amount of $9.5 billion in 2011, which they have not yet been able to 
enforce. The issue of corporate veil was resurrected once more during the Yaiguaje 
enforcement action. Here, the plaintiffs target Chevron and its wholly-owned 7th tier 
Canadian subsidiary. In its statement of defence to the enforcement action,98 Chevron 
stated that ‘…a subsidiary of Chevron Corp. merged with Texaco and thus, Texaco 
and TexPet became indirect subsidiaries of Chevron Corp. Following this transaction, 
Chevron Corp., Texaco and TexPet continued as separate legal entities and they have 
remained so ever since.’ Chevron argued there that it has never operated or owned 
assets in Ecuador, has not participated in any way in the Consortium, Texaco and 
TexPet are legally separate entities from Chevron, and there has never been any valid 
reason to disregard the separate personalities of these entities.99 The plaintiffs sought 
to pierce Chevron Canada’s corporate veil to satisfy a judgment rendered against 
Chevron.100 The first instance court dismissed the plaintiff’s request for piercing the 
veil in the absence of complete domination of the subsidiary coupled with ‘wrongdoing 
akin to fraud’.101 
 
Chevron’s arguments run in the opposite direction in the IIL claim it brought 
against Ecuador. There, Chevron claims, inter alia, that Ecuador’s conduct regarding 
the Lago Agrio case violated the US-Ecuador bilateral investment treaty’s denial of 
justice provisions, 102 as well as its protections on fair and equitable treatment.103 In 
                                                          
98 Statement of Defence of Chevron Corporation to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, dated 2 October 2015, 
para. 26, <www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4407.pdf>  
99 Ibid, Para.30.  
100 This is a case of reverse veil piercing, where the assets of the subsidiary are pursued for liability of the parent. 
101  Yaiguaje v Chevron Corporation 2017 ONSC 135, 20/01/2017. 
102 Chevron argued that “[Ecuador] has pursued a coordinated strategy with the Lago Agrio plaintiffs that 
involves [Ecuador]’s various state organs…that [Ecuador]’s judicial branch has conducted the Lago Agrio 
litigation in total disregard of Ecuadorian law, international standards of fairness and Chevron’s basic rights as 
to due process and natural justice, in coordination between [Ecuador] and the Lago Agrio plaintiffs.”, See 
Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v The Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case no.2009-23 Third 
Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 27 February 2012, para. 3.39. 
103 In this respect, Chevron claims that Ecuador violated the a series of agreements signed by Ecuador and TexPet 
in 1995, 1996 and 1998 that aimed to release TexPet from liability for consequences of the environmental 
damage caused by the operations of TexPet in the Oriente Region; See Ibid para. 1.28. 
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this claim, Chevron invoked the treaty against Ecuador relying on its historical 
investment in Ecuador via Texaco and TexPet. As the parent company, Chevron is 
seeking the protection of the treaty which explicitly allows parent companies to 
advance claims, as protected investors, for the alleged harms done by the host state 
to their subsidiary.104 According to Chevron, its investment in Ecuador that deserves 
the protection of the BIT consists of ‘TexPet’s underlying oil operations in Ecuador’, 
and ‘[TexPet’s] rights under the Settlement Agreements’ signed by and between 
Ecuador and TexPet, releasing the latter from liability.105 The tribunal held that ‘as 
TexPet’s parent company, Chevron is a covered investor under [the BIT] because it 
indirectly owns or controls an “investment” in Ecuador.’106 This is a prime example of 
treaty-based reverse veil-piercing.  
 
In the IIL proceedings, Chevron argued that it met the threshold of involvement 
with its subsidiary’s business in Ecuador, whilst in the domestic claims by the B&HR 
victims; it argued that it did not meet that threshold of involvement with its subsidiary’s 
business in Ecuador.107 This was possible because, as discussed above, the level of 
involvement sufficient in IIL to disregard corporate veil is much less than that required 
under company law rules in most jurisdictions. Even though both cases involve the 
same constellation of facts regarding corporate structure, in the first group of cases 
mentioned above, Chevron, in an attempt to distance itself from TexPet, repeatedly 
invoked the corporate veil, while in the IIL claim it was able to successfully argue for 
disregarding the corporate veil in order to benefit from an investment treaty protection. 
The latter was readily accepted by the investment tribunal, as the US-Ecuador BIT 
explicitly allows reverse veil piercing. The former had to be argued up and down the 
legal process in the past 23 years in various jurisdictions including the US, Canada, 
and Ecuador.  
 
 
VI. Adopting the treaty based veil piercing and the ‘control’ rule in the 
B&HR Context 
 
The state duty to protect under international human rights law comprises a duty 
to ensure that victims of human rights abuses committed by third parties have access 
to effective domestic remedies.108 This core principle is reflected in the B&HR context 
in the third pillar of the UNGPs, requiring both states and businesses to provide 
remedies when abuses occur. Particularly relevant here is the UNGP 26, which 
requires states to remove obstacles to access to judicial remedies, by reducing ‘legal, 
practical and other relevant barriers that could lead to a denial of access to remedy.’ 
The commentary to UNGP 26 lists, as examples of legal barriers, the ability of 
businesses to avoid liability using strategic corporate structuring and the inability of 
                                                          
104 Ibid para 3.102 and 3.235. 
105 Ibid para 3.61. 
106 Ibid para 4.24. 
107 Chevron claims in its pleadings to the tribunal that it is Ecuador that is trying to “have it both ways” by holding 
Chevron liable in the Lago Agrio litigation while also arguing in the IIL claim that Chevron is not entitled to bring 
the arbitration as it has no investment in Ecuador, see Ibid para 4.25. 
108 See for instance, Article 2.3 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and UNCHR, ‘General 
Comment No.31, Nature of the General Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’, (26 May 2004) 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para.8. See also O De Schutter, ‘Towards a New Treaty on Business and Human Rights’ 
(2016) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal, 41-67, 44. 
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victims to access home state courts even when they face a denial of justice in the host 
state. The framework advanced in this paper aims to allow B&HR claimants to pursue 
the parent company in its home jurisdiction for harm caused by the latter’s subsidiary.  
A. ‘Veil piercing’ 
 
The model we propose here allows disregarding the veil between the host state entity 
and the parent company, as well as the veils of the layers of subsidiaries between the 
two entities where necessary. This is made possible by the adoption of a ‘control’ test, 
primarily borrowed from the IIL model, to identify the proper defendant/s in the 
upstream ownership structure of the subsidiary. Veil piercing under this model aims to 
overcome the obstacles created by separate personality and limited liability in three 
stages of access to a judicial remedy by B&HR claimants: jurisdiction, substance and 
enforcement. At each of these stages, the question of whether the veil can be pierced 
will have to be answered separately.. 
 
At the jurisdictional stage, veil piercing would operate to allow courts in the 
home state of the entity controlling109 the subsidiary to assume jurisdiction over the 
claim, despite the overseas locus of the harm and distinct identity of the overseas 
subsidiary. This way, the B&HR claimants would overcome the potential obstacles, 
such as the forum non conveniens principle or the lack of sufficient proximity between 
the forum and the claim, when pursuing a parent company and its subsidiary in home 
state courts. Overcoming this obstacle would mean that the claim will proceed before 
the home states’ courts to the merits stage, rather than being dismissed on the 
grounds that the host state is a more appropriate forum despite the serious challenges 
to obtaining a remedy there. This could, for instance, have allowed the Aguinda 
litigation to proceed in the US against Texaco, as long as Texaco fulfilled the definition 
of a ‘controlling entity’ within the meaning of this proposed framework.  
 
The ability to pierce the veil to enable home state courts to exercise jurisdiction does 
not automatically establish the liability of the parent company. The second stage of the 
enquiry will be whether the parent can be held liable for its subsidiary’s actions or 
omissions. There will be two elements to this. One side of the liability coin is whether 
the veil can be pierced to overcome the limited liability principle. If this can be 
answered in the positive, the plaintiffs would still need to establish that their rights 
under the applicable domestic law or treaty were breached by the subsidiary or the 
parent. So at this juncture, an ability to pierce the veil alone will not automatically 
establish parent liability. It needs to be accompanied by substantive protections 
concerning the rights of the B&HR claimants and a standard of care expected from the 
parent or the subsidiary established in domestic law or in the applicable treaty.  At the 
merits stage, veil piercing would assist in attributing liability to the controlling entity for 
harm ostensibly caused by the host state subsidiary, regardless of the legal distance 
created by layers of intermediary companies. This would allow for (1) the pursuit of the 
parent company before host state courts, where the local subsidiary is defunct or 
underfunded; and, (2) pursuit of the parent company before home state courts. In the 
Aguinda litigation, our proposal would have allowed the US court to consider whether 
to hold Texaco liable for the harm allegedly caused by its subsidiary, as long as Texaco 
fulfilled the definition of a ‘controlling entity’ within the meaning of this proposed 
                                                          
109 The meaning of control for this proposal is explained in Section VI (B) below. 
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framework. Again, the B&HR claimants would have thus sidestepped the domestic law 
requirements for piercing the corporate veil, which are extremely difficult to satisfy,110 
to hold shareholders of a company liable for harm caused by the latter’s activities.  
 
Finally, at the enforcement stage, the model will allow judgments made against 
the subsidiary to be enforced against the parent company where the judgment debtor 
subsidiary is defunct or does not have enough assets to meet its debts. This will allow, 
for instance, judgments rendered in host states against such defunct or impecunious 
subsidiaries to be enforced against the assets of the controlling entity, as long as those 
assets are located in a state signatory to the treaty introducing our model.111 The 
proposed rules on enforcement would, however, not allow enforcement against sister 
corporations (so called ‘horizontal veil piercing’112) within the same group that do not 
qualify as a ‘controlling entity’. Thus, the proposed model would not make a difference 
for the enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment, as the latter was made against the 
Chevron parent in the first place, and as such should be enforceable against the 
parent’s assets, as long as the judgment complies with the rules on recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments in the chosen place of enforcement.113 The 
proposed enforcement rules would make a difference for the victims that are able to 
obtain award for damages against the subsidiary in the host state for the human rights 
harm suffered, but who are not able to enforce the judgment against the subsidiary for 
the reasons explained earlier.114  
 
B. ‘Control’ 
 
The trickiest part of proposing a model for a treaty based veil piercing is to develop a 
satisfactory and sufficiently encompassing definition of ‘control’ that will determine the 
target entity, i.e. the defendant, behind the corporate veil. Even a detailed prescription 
of this concept would have to be applied in individual cases through judicial 
                                                          
110 Particularly, where layers of corporate intermediaries are inserted into the investment structure. 
111 This would not interfere with the operation of the existing bilateral or multilateral treaties on enforcement 
of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters. Our proposal does not aim to overlap with those treaties 
but complement them with special rules on enforcement of judgments rendered against a subsidiary against the 
assets of the parent company located overseas. The recognition & enforcement of the judgment rendered in 
the host state before home state courts would follow the procedure prescribed in such treaties, or in the lack 
thereof, the domestic procedural rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Our proposal 
would add to those rules by allowing the enforcement of the judgment otherwise recognised against the assets 
of the parent company.   
112 M Dearborn, ‘Enterprise Liability: Reviewing and Revitalizing Liability for Corporate Groups’ (2009) 97(1) CLR 
195, 211. 
113 Enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment has so far not been successful. Claimants are avoiding enforcement 
in the US, where Chevron is headquartered, due to a US court decision declaring the judgment as tainted by 
corruption; See Chevron Corp. v Donzinger No.14-0826 (2d Cir. 2016); An enforcement action was brought in 
Canada against the assets of a Canadian subsidiary of Chevron and the shares of Chevron parent in that 
subsidiary. This action was challenged by Chevron on numerous grounds, including the Canadian court’s 
jurisdiction to enforce the Lago Agrio judgment (this portion of the challenge was dismissed), as well as the 
challenges on public policy grounds (these are yet to be decided by the Supreme Court) Yaiguaje v. Chevron 
Corp, 2013 ONCA 758; Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje, 2015 SCC 42.  
114 In Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1991] 1 All ER 929 the defendant parent company liquidated its US subsidiary 
and then successfully resisted in England the enforcement of a judgment obtained in the US for heath harm 
caused by asbestos products. 
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interpretation, sometimes with potentially unforeseen outcomes. Thus, a meaning of 
control is presented here with that caveat in mind.   
 
The understanding of ‘control’ under IIL provides guidance by analogy. Despite 
the lack of a uniform definition of control adopted in IIL, there is a level consistency in 
the understanding of ‘control’ throughout the system owing to its investor-friendly spirit. 
This spirit is reflected in how generously the concept of ‘control’ has been defined in 
treaties and interpreted in awards, aiming to push for greater protection of investors 
via a broader application of treaties and exercise of jurisdiction by arbitral tribunals.  
 
IIL accepts that control of the local subsidiary could be exercised via ownership 
of shares, voting rights or management rights, or a combination thereof. IIL definitions 
of control recognise that control can be exercised by direct or indirect holders of 
shares, voting rights or management rights in a company, thus catering for there being 
layers of intermediaries between the host state subsidiary and its controlling parent. 
Thus, IIL adopts a legal ‘control’ approach and not a day-to-day control approach. 
Control in the IIL context is not used as a reference to active involvement in the 
business activities and decisions of the subsidiary. It is also not linked to whether the 
controlling entity was under a due diligence obligation for the behaviour of its 
subsidiaries. Nor does it question whether the parent had assumed responsibility 
under a standard of duty of care vis-à-vis the persons harmed by the activities of the 
subsidiary. It is a reference to the interest of the foreign party who is ‘behind’ or has 
‘made’ the investment.   
 
By adopting a liberal ‘control’ rule, IIL aims to cater for the realities of making a 
foreign investment, when investments are carried out via a local subsidiary.115 If treaty 
based veil piercing was not allowed under IIL, foreign investors operating via local 
subsidiaries would be significantly limited in their ability to invoke IIL protections. IIL 
does not require investors to show that they had any active involvement in the policies 
or the activities of the subsidiary to establish control. Instead, it simply recognises the 
need for protection due to the economic interest of the parent in the subsidiary. This 
economic interest of the parent in the subsidiary is also a reality in the B&HR context. 
We propose that a new treaty on B&HR should take this economic interest into account 
in regulating access to remedy by allowing claims to be brought against direct or 
indirect controllers of host state subsidiaries. Sometimes the ability to reach the deeper 
pockets of the parent company will make access to remedy possible for B&HR 
claimants. Beyond the remedy provided to individual victims, exposing the parent to 
liability can have a preventative effect by potentially pushing the parent to ensure 
better institutional behaviour throughout the group. Even if potential liability deters 
some businesses from making otherwise economically and socially beneficial 
investments, that is a risk worth taking to improve respect for human rights. 
 
The IIL model makes parent companies more accessible to claimants by 
eliminating the necessity to show a certain level of parent involvement in the harmful 
activity of the subsidiary. It is often extremely difficult for business and human rights 
claimants to prove the required levels of involvement, as they often have no access to 
internal company documents that might prove such involvement.  To overcome these 
challenges, we propose to transpose the liberal understanding of ‘control’ observed in 
                                                          
115 C H Schreuer et al., (n.66) 296. 
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IIL into our model, based on direct or indirect ownership rights and not on the level of 
active involvement in subsidiary policies. The treaty could also stipulate the threshold 
of control proposed below as a trigger for the substantive obligations of a parent 
company, such as the duty of care or human rights due diligence obligations, vis-à-vis 
the BHR claimants. 
 
IIL does not provide clarity as to the extent of ownership rights that would 
amount to ‘control’ within the meaning of IIL. We consulted several proposals from 
leading scholars writing on the issue of the corporate veil in the context of B&HR, 
which range from 20% to 51% shareholding when defining control.116 The lowest 
threshold was proposed by Macklin and Simmons in their proposal for a negligence 
based home state civil liability regime.117 Among the indicators of control proposed in 
their book is direct or indirect ownership of ‘20 per cent of the voting interests in an 
affiliate or other business entity’.118 They find support for this threshold in securities 
law by reference to the meaning of control under the Ontario Securities Act which 
‘creates a rebuttable presumption that someone can materially control an entity 
through a 20 per cent interest.’119 
 
Skinner proposes a statute-based model that will allow courts to:  
 
…disregard limited liability of parent corporations for claims of customary 
international human rights violations and serious environmental torts where a 
parent corporation takes a majority interest or creates a subsidiary as part of 
a unified economic enterprise ….120  
 
The report does not elaborate on the meaning of ‘majority interest’ or ‘creation of a 
subsidiary as part of a unified economic enterprise’. Majority interest is usually 
understood as holding at least 50% interest in the company. In terms of the material 
scope of the proposal, Skinner does not elaborate on what would constitute customary 
international human rights violations and serious environmental torts, but states that 
she opted to limit the claims, as it would be more difficult to persuade policy-makers 
to adopt this type of parental liability for general torts. 
 
                                                          
116 P Simons and A Macklin (n.75); O De Schutter (n.108), G Skinner (n.11); ‘Control’ is also advanced as one of 
the determinants of ‘connected claims’ for purposes of jurisdiction of a domestic court under the Sofia 
Guidelines for the Best Practices for International Civil Litigation for Human Rights Violations. In Article 2.2, the 
Guidelines treat claims closely connected where defendants are related either because they form part of the 
same corporate group or one defendant controls the other; See The ILA Sofia Conference, International Civil 
Litigation for Human Rights Violations Final Report, 31 (The Report does not describe in detail what control 
means in this context, other than saying that it is ‘normally defined on the basis of stock ownership’, but it could 
be extended to contractual relationships where for instance there is a relationship of dependency between a 
supplier and a purchaser). 
117 P Simons and A Macklin (n.75) 286. 
118 P Simons and A Macklin (n.75) 356, they don’t limit the indicators of control to share ownership, and also 
refer to the ability of one company to ordinarily direct or instruct the conduct of another company, power to 
elect at least 30 per cent of the BoD of an affiliate, power to direct the management and policies of the other 
entity, or otherwise have the ability to materially influence the behaviour of the other entity.  
119 P Simons and A Macklin (n.75) 356, n.201. 
120 G Skinner (n.11) 24. 
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In his article in support of the proposed treaty on business and human rights 
De Schutter recommends the adoption of an extraterritorial obligation on home states 
to impose on parent companies located in their jurisdiction a due diligence obligation, 
defined by statute, to effectively monitor the behaviour of the subsidiaries which it 
‘controls.’ He then defines control with reference to stock ownership of 50% and 
above, and this way removes the need to assess, on a case by case basis, the 
involvement of the parent in the policies and activities of the subsidiary.121  
 
 
 We find additional inspiration in each of these proposals in unpacking the 
elements of our model, while our primary inspiration remains IIL. Common to all the 
above proposals is the aim to incorporate an exception to the traditional corporate veil 
doctrine into a legally binding instrument. The instrument of choice in these proposals 
is statute, while in ours it is a treaty. The reason why we opted for the treaty is that, if 
successful, it would have the effect of creating a level playing field. While Skinner and 
De Schutter refer only to ‘majority interest’ as determinant of control, we propose a 
model which is more flexible and accommodating to variants of group governance 
models, similar to Simons and Macklin. 
 
In more precisely defining the meaning of control we found most useful the 
legislative guidance in the EU Accounting Directive122 describing ‘control’ in corporate 
groups for purposes of consolidated reporting. Instead of prescribing a single indicator 
or percentage of ownership for control, it provides a definition that accommodates the 
potential variations in the governance of a corporate group. Its rules are realistic and 
sufficiently detailed. Furthermore, certain large companies in the EU are now required 
to include in their consolidated annual report information on human rights,123 and there 
might be more jurisdictions adopting this type of human rights reporting. It would be 
useful to align the meaning of control for purposes of civil claims with that of the 
reporting requirement. Pursuant to Article 22 (1) of the Directive a parent company124 
controls a subsidiary125 if it: 
(a) has a majority of the shareholders' or members' voting rights in another 
undertaking (a subsidiary undertaking);  
(b) has the right to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the 
administrative, management or supervisory body of another undertaking (a 
subsidiary undertaking) and is at the same time a shareholder in or member 
of that undertaking; 
(c) has the right to exercise a dominant influence over an undertaking (a 
subsidiary undertaking) of which it is a shareholder or member, pursuant to a 
contract entered into with that undertaking or to a provision in its 
memorandum or articles of association, where the law governing that 
                                                          
121 O De Schutter, (n.108) 53. 
122 Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial 
statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings [2013] OJ 
L182/19. 
123 Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending 
Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain 
large undertakings and groups [2014] OJ L330/1. 
124 Article 2(9) defines parent company as “an undertaking which controls one or more subsidiary undertakings” 
125 Article 2(10) defines a subsidiary as “an undertaking controlled by a parent undertaking, including any 
subsidiary undertaking of an ultimate parent undertaking” 
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subsidiary undertaking permits its being subject to such contracts or 
provisions. 
… 
(d) is a shareholder in or member of an undertaking, and:  
(i) a majority of the members of the administrative, management or 
supervisory bodies of that undertaking (a subsidiary undertaking) who have 
held office during the financial year, during the preceding financial year and 
up to the time when the consolidated financial statements are drawn up, have 
been appointed solely as a result of the exercise of its voting rights; or  
(ii) controls alone, pursuant to an agreement with other shareholders in or 
members of that undertaking (a subsidiary undertaking), a majority of 
shareholders' or members' voting rights in that undertaking...   
 
We propose the adoption of the same approach.126 The existence of control for 
purposes of treaty-based veil piercing will be satisfied where an investor, directly or 
indirectly, holds a majority of the voting rights in the local subsidiary; or the amount of 
shares or other rights held give it the right to appoint or remove a majority of the 
subsidiary’s management board members; or contractual arrangements between 
shareholders or provisions of the subsidiary’s constitution give it the right to exercise 
influence that would be otherwise exercised by a majority shareholder. 
 
A final point on control involves investments carried out in the host state through 
joint venture structures with other partners. These joint venture investments might 
operate through a separate legal entity incorporated in the host state or in another 
jurisdiction.127 In other cases, the joint venture might operate without a separate entity, 
only via contractual arrangements. If it is possible to identify a joint venture partner 
that satisfies the description of ‘control’ provided in the preceding paragraph, the 
liability would lie with that entity. If no single entity participating in the joint venture 
fulfils the above definition, who should bear the responsibility? Drawing an analogy 
from IIL cases where non-majority partners in investments brought claims against host 
states for their share of loss,128 it should be possible for B&HR victims to pursue each 
joint venture partner, including the operator of the joint venture, and their parent 
companies, under a joint and several liability framework.  
 
C. ‘Treaty-based’ 
                                                          
126 A similar definition is also found in s.1159 of the Companies Act 2006. 
127 The latter was the case for Talisman’s investment in Sudan. P Simons and A Macklin (n.75) 28 “On 17 August 
1998 Talisman agreed to buy Arakis Energy’s 25 per cent share in the GNPOC joint venture for approximately 
US$277 million. GNPOC was registered as a corporation in Mauritius. Talisman operated in Sudan through its 
Dutch-registered subsidiary Talisman Greater Nile BV (TGNBV).” 40 per cent of the JV was held by the China 
National Petroleum Corporation and 30 per cent by the national oil company of Malaysia. 
128 Many cases filed against Argentina in the aftermath of the 2001 financial crisis were based on ‘shares’ as 
investment; See for instance, Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic (Decision on 
Jurisdiction) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal Case No.ARB01/3, 14 January 2004); AES Corporation v The Argentine 
Republic (Decision on Jurisdiction) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal Case No. ARB/02/17, 26 April 2005); Teinver S.A., 
Transportes de Cercanías S.A. and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v. The Argentine Republic (Decision on 
Jurisdiction) (ICSID Arbitral Tribunal Case No.ARB/09/1, 21 December 2012). 
 27 
 
We propose this model to be incorporated into a draft convention with the effect of 
creating directly enforceable rights by covered B&HR claimants capable of 
enforcement against parent companies who violated their human rights. In this sense, 
it is analogous to IIL protections found in treaties signed by states, enforceable by non-
state actors, i.e., investors, or to the regional human rights treaties that create rights 
enforceable by individuals before the regional human rights courts. One of the reasons 
behind the success of the international framework for the protection of foreign 
investment is that it is supported by an extensive network of treaties. Unlike B&HR 
claimants, investors do not have to rely merely on soft law principles or domestic law 
standards to safeguard their rights, but they receive the backing of legally binding 
international commitments. 
A treaty-based protection framework for human rights harm caused by 
businesses would help ensure that human rights obligations of businesses have ‘at 
least equal status’ as the rights guaranteed to them under IIL and international trade 
law.129 In the more specific context of access to remedy for B&HR claimants, a treaty 
commitment would procedurally empower the victims by opening new avenues for 
making ‘rights demands’ with higher likelihood of success than would be the case in 
the absence of treaty provisions enhancing access to remedy.130 Procedural 
empowerment of investors via a right to bring direct international law claims against 
host states is considered IIL’s most revolutionary aspect.131 Our model proposes a 
similar kind of procedural empowerment backed by international law for B&HR 
claimants. 
In addition to its force, a treaty-based model would allow this framework to be 
implemented more effectively. Due to the multi-jurisdictional nature of the corporate 
structures involved, having, for instance, only a group of individual host states 
incorporating the model into their national law sporadically without home state 
adherence to the same principles would undermine the functioning of the model. 
Without an international instrument threading commitments together and matching 
host state-home state commitments, individual states would be less willing to sign up 
to a race to the top.132 
We envisage two possible host instruments for the model proposed here: (1) it 
could be incorporated into the proposed B&HR treaty, or (2) into investment treaties, 
existing or future.133 While a multilateral treaty on B&HR would potentially provide a 
                                                          
129 D Bilchitz, The Moral and Legal Necessity for a Business and Human Rights Treaty, p. 9 published on 
<http://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/The%20Moral%20and%20Legal%20Necessity%20for%20a%20
Business%20and%20Human%20Rights%20Treaty%20February%202015%20FINAL%20FINAL.pdf>; D Bilchitz, 
‘The Necessity for a Business and Human Rights Treaty’ (2016) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 203, 215  
130 B A Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (CUP 2009) 125 (Argues 
that “treaties are causally meaningful to the extent that they empower individuals, groups, or parts of the state 
with different rights preferences that were not empowered to the same extent in the absence of the treaties.”) 
131 B A Simmons, ‘Bargaining over BITS, Arbitrating Awards: The Regime for Protection and Promotion of 
International Investment’, (2014) 66(1) World Politics 12, 17. 
132 D Bilchitz, ‘The Necessity for a Business and Human Rights Treaty’, (n.129) 218-19. 
133 A multilateral convention that aims to establish universal jurisdiction in signatory states over civil suits for 
remedying human rights violations was previously proposed; See B Stephens, ‘Translating Filartiga: A 
Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations’, 
(2002) 27 Yale J of Int’l L 1; Similarly incorporation of a civil liability framework, offering three options to 
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wider coverage of protection, the obvious disadvantage of taking that path is the 
difficulty of reaching consensus on a global treaty, if consensus is reached at all.134 
Even if a consensus is seemingly reached, if only a small number of states give 
ratification, the proposed model is unlikely to fulfil its goal. The investment treaty route 
appears more achievable in that sense, as it requires the consensus of two states, or 
at most a limited number of states within a particular region. It also secures host and 
home state commitments. There are recent examples of investment treaties from the 
global south that move towards recognizing the rights of host communities to seek 
remedies in the investor’s home state.135 The disadvantage of the investment treaty 
route is its ad hoc non-centralised nature. This feature actually motivated more states 
to conclude BITs due to host states’ desire to attract capital and home states’ desire 
to enter into new markets under favourable terms.136 In competing for markets and 
capital, treaty commitments protecting investment were perceived beneficial for all 
parties involved.137 Lack of comparable powerful incentives in the B&HR context to 
convince states to adopt the model proposed here is unfortunately a limitation of our 
proposal. Opening up a new avenue of liability for businesses, as proposed in this 
paper, is unlikely to attract a race between states to sign up. States’ perception that 
regulation of business would adversely affect flows of investment and opposition of 
powerful economic actors with strong influence, via lobbying, on the investment treaty 
negotiation process138 are likely to discourage states from committing, unless they can 
be convinced they will not be at a competitive disadvantage by doing so.139 In this 
respect, a multilateral B&HR treaty could secure a level playing field in this area. 
However, the investment treaty regime is going through a reform process as states 
from all levels of development negotiate new generation investment treaties, and the 
inclusion of investor obligations and rights of third parties in these treaties is becoming 
                                                          
overcome the separate personality challenge (enterprise liability, liability insurance or posting a bond as 
security),  in investment treaties was proposed by J A VanDuzer et al., ‘Integrating Sustainable Development into 
International Investment Agreements: A Guide for Developing Countries’ (2012) Prepared for the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, <www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/6th_annual_forum_commonwealth_guide.pdf>; While 
our model finds inspiration and support in those proposals, (1) it does not advocate universal jurisdiction, (2) it 
takes IIL rules on treaty-based veil piercing as a model and not the enterprise liability model (3) provides greater 
detail regarding the elements of the treaty-based veil piercing exercise in the context of B&HR litigation.  
134  D Cassel and A Ramasastry, ‘White Paper: Options for a Treaty on Business and Human Rights’ (2015) 6 Notre 
Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law 1 (They identify the key options and challenges for a 
potential treaty on business and human rights); Lee McConnell, ‘Assessing the Feasibility of a Business and 
Human Rights Treaty’, (2017) 66 ICLQ 143 (Advances a theoretical model for a treaty that addresses non-state 
actors directly). 
135 See Section 20 of the Morocco-Nigeria BIT. 
136 B A Simmons, (n.131) 20-21(causing a sharp increase in the number of BITs in the 1980s and 1990s). 
137 Whether BITs have been beneficial to host economies is disputed; See K P Sauvant and L E Sachs The Effect 
of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment 
Flows (OUP 2009); J Tobin and S Rose-Ackerman ‘When BITs Have Some Bite: The Political-Economic 
Environment for Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2011) 6(1) The Review of International Organizations 1; A Kerner, 
‘Why Should I Believe You? The Costs and Consequences of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2009) 53(1) 
International Studies Quarterly 73. 
138 See for instance, the work of Corporate Europe Observatory on corporate lobbying for TTIP, 
http://corporateeurope.org/international-trade/2015/07/ttip-corporate-lobbying-paradise  
139 For a detailed account of the problem of prisoners’ dilemma and collective action in the context of 
international law, See K W Abbott, ‘Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International 
Lawyers’ (1989) 14 Yale J of Int’l L 335.  
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increasingly salient.140 A reasonable middle path might be the adoption of the model 
initially in regional investment treaties, such as those that are being pursued by the 
EU.141  
D. ‘Scope of application’ 
A major question about a treaty on B&HR is which human rights it would cover.142 It 
goes beyond the scope of this article to provide an appropriate solution to that 
question. However, it is necessary to touch on the subject in order to determine the 
scope of application of the proposed treaty-based veil piercing. The material scope of 
the proposed framework would depend on the host instrument. If the model is adopted 
in an investment treaty, the material scope could be limited to civil liability, i.e. tort or 
delict, claims against the investor by individuals for violations that amount to harm to 
human rights recognised in the two Covenants, or it could be limited to the IHRL 
obligations signed up to by the host state.143 If the model is incorporated into a future 
treaty governing human rights responsibilities of businesses, the material scope of the 
proposed civil liability framework would be determined by reference to the human 
rights included within the scope of that treaty.144 In both cases, the law governing the 
substance of the civil claim would be determined with reference to the conflict of law 
rules of the lex fori. 
The personal scope of the framework would also depend on the host 
instrument. If the model is implanted into a BIT, it would include a second group of 
beneficiaries to the treaty, i.e. B&HR claimants, in addition to investors. This would 
render covered investors indirect duty bearers under the treaty in addition to being 
right holders. It would be enforceable by individuals harmed in the host state to the 
BIT against ‘investors’ located in the home state. If it is included in a specialised treaty 
on B&HR, the rights provided would be enforceable against controlling entities located 
in home states signatory to the treaty for harm caused in both signatory and non-
signatory host states. 
 Finally, IIL protections are safeguarded via the IIA mechanism outside local 
courts, and thus they do not require signatory states to incorporate these protections 
into their national law. The rights envisaged for B&HR claimants in our model require 
enforcement at the local level by national courts in the host and home states.145 The 
proposed treaty based model would oblige the signatory states to adjust their domestic 
law to accommodate the claims envisaged. However, depending on the domestic 
                                                          
140 See for instance, the EU’s investment and trade policy on http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/new-
trade-strategy/; The Morocco-Nigeria BIT; The Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, available 
at http://dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/ModelBIT_Annex_0.pdf. 
141 The EU Commission’s DG on Trade has set out its investment and trade policy on 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/new-trade-strategy/ 
142 D Cassel and A Ramasastry, (n.134) 38. 
143 This could prove problematic if the host state has not ratified major human rights treaties, or if the B&HR 
claimants invoke a right contained in a treaty ratified by the host state but not by the home state before the 
latter’s courts. 
144 There is yet no consensus on the precise substantive scope of the B&HR treaty within the intergovernmental 
working group, See C Lopez and B Shea, ‘Negotiating a Treaty on Business and Human Rights: A Review of the 
First Intergovernmental Session’ (2016) 1(1) Business and Human Rights Journal 111, 114. 
145 Under our model, victims could sue in home or host state courts, the former more commonly as a result of 
the access to remedy issues in certain host states, discussed above. 
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constitutional requirements of the signatory states, the framework might require 
implementation into national law to take effect.146   
 
VII. Conclusion  
 
Laws governing business enterprises and business transactions were designed and 
have developed, nationally and internationally, to increase, and facilitate economic 
activity, without necessarily taking into consideration other interests in society. These 
underlying rationales of laws governing business activity dictate how legal principles 
are interpreted when there is ambiguity or clash with a non-economic interest.147 In 
parallel to developments in the economic field, human rights law has also developed 
into significant body of law, with the aim of eliminating abuse of power by states, 
compelling states to ensure basic rights are guaranteed and holding states 
accountable nationally and internationally where violations occur.  
These two streams of legal principles have, for the most part and for many 
decades, developed in isolation from each other. 148 Corporate/commercial lawyers 
dealt little, if at all, with human rights law, likewise human rights lawyers for the most 
part have paid little attention to economic actors and laws governing businesses.149 
This, however, is no longer the case. The increasing interaction between these fields 
has been recognised in the past few decades and the need to think about human rights 
obligations of business enterprises has already been advanced and discussed by 
many, whether through state regulation or by direct attribution of these obligations to 
companies, the latter less successfully.150 
 
Following in this wind of change, we argue that this new thinking calls for 
redrawing the boundaries of the most basic principles of corporate law, i.e. separate 
personality and limited liability, without leaving these basic principles devoid of 
meaning. Instead of treating the disregarding of the corporate veil as a no-go area that 
can only be visited in extremely rare occasions allowed by corporate law, policy-
makers should introduce new and carefully thought out exceptions to these core 
corporate law principles which aim to safeguard the protection of fundamental rights 
of the wider society. In this spirit, theories of enterprise liability, direct parent liability, 
and due diligence standard have been proposed by leading scholars as models to 
overcome the accountability gap by separate personality. Policy-makers and courts 
have been slow in embracing these proposals so far.151  
We propose to import the IIL rules on treaty based veil piercing that operate to 
protect investors into a framework for protection of individuals against human rights 
                                                          
146 See E Denza, ‘The Relationship between International and National Law’, in M D Evans (ed) International Law 
(3rd edn, OUP 2010) 411-438. 
147 See for a comprehensive analysis of balancing competing interests in the context of foreign investment S 
Leader, ‘Human Rights, Risks and New Strategies for Global Investment’ (2006) 9(3) JIEL 657.  
148 D Shelton, ‘Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World’ (2002) 25(2) Boston College of International and 
Comparative Law Review 273, 279-280. 
149 C van Dam (n.20) 225-226. 
150 See D Shelton, (n.151) 273-322; P Muchlinski, (n.26); V Harper Ho, ‘Of Enterprise Principles and Corporate 
Groups: Does Corporate Law Reach Human Rights?’ (2013) 52 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 113.  
151 The first example of a mandatory human rights due diligence requirement for certain very large businesses 
is established by the new French legislation on Duty of Vigilance for parent companies LOI  n° 2017-399 du 27 
mars 2017 Art. L. 225-102-4.-I. 
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harm inflicted by the same investors.  Like previous proposals, ours aims to open up 
the possibility of assessing which entity within a corporate group should bear 
responsibility by allowing courts to look behind the formality of corporate legal structure 
in appropriate cases and to apportion blame more fairly. It aims to do so by putting 
human rights claimants on a similar footing with investors in IIL claims. A treaty 
commitment to remove the corporate veil obstacle to access to remedy would support 
the ongoing efforts at national and the international levels to guarantee corporate 
respect for human rights.  
